Citizen
Advocacy Center
238
N. York Road • Elmhurst IL 60126
PhonE:
(630) 833-4080
Www.citizenadvocacycenter.org
The November 2000 Presidential election publicly showcased many problems with America’s electoral system and highlighted the need for immediate and significant nationwide electoral reform. American voters learned that, among many other problems, the punch card voting system used within most states to elect public officials was partially to blame for the controversy. Voters demanded that election authorities evaluate voting and ensure the problems of 2000 would not be repeated. As a result of this public outcry, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA authorized the distribution of $3.9 billion dollars in federal funds, over three years, to assist states with improving the administration of elections. States use the federal funds to purchase new voting equipment, develop election worker training materials, create statewide voter registration databases, and improve access to the polls for all Americans. Deadlines were set for suggested and mandatory requirements. The goal is for election authorities to make significant improvements in time for the November 2004 election, and achieve full implementation of all mandates by 2006.
Following the passage of HAVA, state and local
election authorities were given the opportunity to apply for federal funds to
replace the punch card voting systems that were at the center of controversy in
2000. Companies manufacturing election equipment eagerly demonstrated
technologically advanced systems, including touch screen electronic voting
machines, otherwise known as “direct recording electronic” voting machines
(DREs). Election authorities across the country began spending millions of
dollars to purchase new voting equipment, and began touting the advantages of
the upgraded systems to their citizens. However, the American public discovered
electronic voting presented new and controversial challenges focused on voting
machine technology, security concerns, and the lack of a voter verifiable paper
trail. The controversy over DREs has forced many states to reexamine the very
system that was supposed to rectify voter concerns.
Meanwhile, two-thirds of American voters, including all voters in
Illinois, will use the vilified punch cards or optical scan voting systems
during the November 2004 Presidential election. Illinois does not currently use
electronic voting systems, however, the State Board of Elections and the 110
election authorities throughout Illinois are preparing for electronic voting. By
January 1, 2006, HAVA requires election authorities to provide a DRE or other
accessible voting system in each polling place that allows disabled and visually
impaired voters to cast an independent and private ballot. Some counties will
provide electronic voting for all voters and some will have mixed systems.
DuPage County will continue to use the newly purchased optical scan voting
machines and comply with HAVA by providing electronic voting machines once the
State Board of Elections approves a system for use.
The following guide offers information on voting systems used throughout
the United States, voting system standards, voter verifiable paper audit trails,
and a variety of electronic voting resources.
Voting Systems in the United
States
Each state has the discretion to
choose the voting system that best meets the needs of their citizens. Despite
the existence of federal voting standards, states are not required to adopt
federal standards or conduct their own independent testing before using a voting
system. In Illinois, however, the Illinois Election Code requires all voting
systems used within the State to meet the federal requirements and receive
certification by the Illinois State Board of Elections. The Illinois State Board
of Elections has authority to approve punch card, optical scan, or direct
recording electronic voting systems. To date, the State Board has not approved
the use of any electronic voting system.
According to
Election Data Services, during the November 2004 election nearly 29% of eligible
voters will use computerized voting systems, 32% will use optical scan systems,
19% will use punch cards, 13% will use lever machines, less than 1% will use
paper ballots, and 6% will use mixed systems.
The oldest
voting system used is the paper ballot. Using a paper ballot and a pencil or
pen, the voter marks their choice for candidate or political question and places
the ballot in a box. Ballots are counted manually after polls close. This method
was universally used during the 19th century and is still used throughout the
country, particularly in small communities and rural areas. In 2000, 370
counties used paper ballots. For the 2004 election, approximately 299 counties
are expected to use paper ballots exclusively.
States with jurisdictions
using paper ballots: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin
Mechanical lever machines have a steel booth that contains a card with
the list of candidates and political questions, several switches, and a large
lever. Voters review the list and vote by flipping the switch below their
choice. Once the voter has completed reviewing the ballot and has flipped all
necessary switches, the voter pulls the large lever. The lever registers the
votes on a counter located on the back of the machine. After the polling place
closes, votes cast in each machine are tallied by election judges. While lever
machines give the voter the opportunity to make changes prior to casting final
votes, the machine does not provide a verifiable paper audit trail, as required
by HAVA. Additionally, they do not allow disabled and visually impaired voters
the opportunity to cast a private, independent ballot.
Lever machines were introduced in 1892 and were widely used until the 1970s. They are no longer produced and are considered antiques, however, many states still allow their use. Lever machines were used by 20.7% of American voters during the 1996 election, and 18% of American voters during the 2000 election. For the 2004 election, 270 counties across the country will use lever machines.
States with jurisdictions using lever voting: Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
Punch card machines use a paper ballot, a ballot
book listing the candidates and political questions, a metal puncher, and a
computerized card sorter. In the voting booth, the voter inserts the ballot into
a slot and opens the ballot book.
The voter uses a metal puncher to punch out the rectangle, otherwise
known as the chad, next to the candidate of their choice. When finished, the
voter removes the card and places it in the ballot box. Usually, the voter feeds
the ballot into a computer vote tabulator at the precinct. The tabulator counts
the number of perforations next to each candidate’s name. In some precincts,
election judges put all ballots into the computer tabulator after the polls
close.
Once considered to be the safest way to vote, punch card machines were the main source of controversy following the 2000 election. Many jurisdictions did not know how to properly count votes because states did not have a uniform definition of what constituted a vote. Some jurisdictions counted votes as long as the chad was perforated in one corner, whereas other jurisdictions only counted the vote if the chad was completely detached. HAVA requires each state to develop a uniform definition of what constitutes a vote.
States with jurisdictions using punch cards: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming
Optical scan voting systems use a paper ballot, a
pencil, and a scanning/tabulating machine with a memory card that scans and
counts the votes. Voters mark their choices on the ballot using a marker,
typically a #2 pencil. If the jurisdiction has a central count optical scan
system, voters deposit the ballot in a ballot box and election judges feed them
in the tabulator machine after the poll closes. If the jurisdiction uses a
precinct count optical scan machine, the voter feeds the ballot into the
tabulating machine. The machine notifies the voter if there is a problem with
the ballot, such as an over vote (choosing more than one candidate in a
contest) or an under vote (failing to make a selection in a contest). The voter
then has the option of correcting the ballot or overriding the vote, in which
case the vote will not count. A voter choosing to correct the ballot must
request a new ballot from an election judge. Once the ballot is complete, the
voter deposits the ballot into the machine and the ballot is preserved in a ballot boxes.
Ballots are used if a recount is necessary and serve as paper record of all
votes cast. After the polls close, the election judges run a final tally and all
votes are counted. Results are either transmitted via modem or the memory card
is read by a central computer after the equipment is returned to the election
authority.
Optical scan voting machines are considered safe and do not pose many security concerns. Most run on batteries or have an electrical cord and a battery backup. The paper ballot serves as a safeguard in case of computer malfunction. However, precinct count optical scan voting machines that transmit election results to a central counting location via modem have been subject to criticism because of the increased risk of tampering. Additionally, optical scan voting systems do not allow disabled and visually impaired voters the opportunity to cast a private and independent ballot.
States with jurisdictions
using optical scan: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia*, Florida, Hawaii*, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma*, Oregon**, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island*, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
* Denotes uniform optical scan ** All elections conducted by mail using optical scan ballots
Direct
Recording Electronic Voting Machines (DREs)
A “Direct Recording Electronic” voting machine,
more commonly referred to as a DRE, electronically records votes directly
entered by the voter. The computer-based system is usually a touch screen voting
machine, although some DREs use switches instead of touch screens. Using a DRE,
the voter selects the candidate or votes on the issue by touching the computer
screen. Votes are saved in a variety of locations within the computer memory and
can be tallied throughout the election or after the polls close. Despite
benefits to voters and administrators, security concerns have placed
electronic voting and DREs at the
center of controversy and ignited
national debate.
Improved access to voting is a definite advantage with a DRE system.
Devices are available to provide disabled and visually impaired voters the
opportunity to cast a private, independent ballot. The touch screen eliminates
the use of the marking pencil and allows greater access for individuals with
limited mobility. Earphones are also available for visually impaired voters or voters with
limited reading skills. DREs can provide ballots in multiple languages. DREs
comply with second chance voting requirements of the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA). Voters have the opportunity to privately review and make changes to
the ballot before it is officially cast and counted. The machine notifies the
voter if they overvote (vote for more than one candidate) or undervote (fail to
cast a vote for a contest). Since votes are directly tabulated, election
officials can provide fast election results and reduce possible errors due to
ballot handling.
Electronic voting machines are beneficial, however, security issues,
computer
malfunctions, and a lack of a voter verifiable paper trail have forced
many election officials and voters to oppose the use of DREs. Studies released
by John Hopkins University and Rice University revealed flaws in the design and
development of electronic voting machines and alleged that computer hackers
could alter the outcome of elections. Voting machine manufacturers, such as
Diebold Election Systems, Inc., have denied such claims, but independent studies
have determined that electronic voting is susceptible to tampering. Any voting
system is vulnerable if proper procedures and safeguards are not in place, but
DREs present a unique problem because they do not provide the same type of paper
trail as other voting machines.
Under HAVA, voting systems are required to produce an auditable paper trail, however, HAVA does not specify that the paper trail must be verifiable by the voter. Citizen groups, lawmakers, and election equipment manufacturers debate the need for a voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT). DREs are quite expensive compared to other voting systems, and when a voter verified paper audit trail is required the cost significantly increases. DREs comply with HAVA because voter information can be printed throughout the day or at the end of the election. However, many people question how voters can be assured their votes are counted citing safeguards for a system crash, incorrectly computed votes, and a lack of paper backup, or worse case scenario, hacker manipulation of election results. With all the controversy and the pros and cons of using DREs, the ultimate debate remains whether or not the advantages outweigh the concerns.
States with jurisdictions
using DREs: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware*, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia*, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland*, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nevada*, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming
* Denotes uniform DRE
Voting
System Standards
What are voting system
standards?
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) developed voting system standards with the assistance of a variety of groups, including election equipment experts and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED). They are voluntary guidelines used to assist state and local election authorities purchasing election equipment. The standards ensure the voting systems used within their jurisdictions work accurately and reliably. Voting system standards contain technical specifications used as guidelines to ensure that automated voting systems (both paper ballot and electronic systems) are accurate, reliable, and secure. The standards include functional criteria as well as technical requirements for hardware, software, security, quality assurance, and documentation. Recommended testing procedures to ensure that voting systems meet these requirements are also included. The standards rate voting systems use criteria such as electronic management, accessibility for people with disabilities and the visually impaired, communication capacities, voter “friendliness,” and audit trails.
Until recently, the FEC headed efforts to develop and review voting
system standards. NASED was responsible for qualified voting systems. With the
passage of HAVA, the responsibility for reviewing voting system guidelines and
standards was
transferred to the newly created Election Assistance Commission (EAC). To
date, the EAC Technical Guidance Committee has not determined how voting system
standards will be administered in the future. Voting system standards and
certification information is available on FEC and NASED
websites.
How are voting systems tested using the
standards?
There are three levels of tests performed on voting systems to ensure
that the end product works accurately, reliably, and appropriately. The first
level is the qualifying test. Manufacturers interested in having their equipment
qualified submit their devices to an independent testing authority designated
(ITA) by NASED. The ITA performs a variety of tests on the equipment, including
any software programs and coding. If the equipment passes all tests, NASED may
qualify the equipment. Level two,
certification tests, may be performed by individual states. States may require
additional testing before certifying equipment for use. Manufacturers must pay
for any required testing. The final level, acceptance tests, should be performed
by individual jurisdictions acquiring the system. Election authorities should
perform their own testing to determine if the equipment meets the needs of the
citizens under their jurisdiction.
Are states required to use voting system
standards?
NO!! States may voluntarily adopt the standards. The FEC recommends
states adopt federal standards, develop their own certification processes, and
test at the local level to ensure the system meets the needs of the local
community.
Has Illinois adopted the Federal
standards?
YES!! Voting systems used by the 110 election authorities in Illinois
must meet the federal standards and receive certification by the Illinois State
Board of Elections. All voting software must be escrowed. Under Illinois law,
the State Board of Elections has discretion to certify punch card voting
machines, optical scan voting machines, and direct recording electronic voting
machines. As of July 2004, the Illinois State Board of Elections has only
certified punch card and optical scan systems. Electronic voting devices are
being reviewed, however, none have been certified. Many states are waiting for
the Election Assistance Commission to provide new standards and guidelines
before certifying any electronic voting machines.
What is a VVPAT?
A voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) allows a voter using an electronic voting machine to independently verify that the machine correctly recorded and counted the votes. A voter using a paper ballot, punch card, or an optical scan ballot, has a paper record in-hand and is provided with the opportunity to independently review all votes before casting the ballot. Voters electronically voting using most DREs do not receive a printed version of their ballot and do not have the opportunity to verify that the choices they have selected will actually be counted as a vote. The argument in favor of VVPAT is simply voter security. Electronic voting technology is unreliable and subject to error or election tampering. If election tampering is suspected, or if an error occurs, there is no way to determine the outcome of the election without a VVPAT. Many argue there is no need for a VVPAT since computers record the information in a variety of locations and election tampering would require a large-scale conspiracy.
HAVA requires voting systems used in elections for Federal office produce
a paper record that can be used for manual audits. However, the interpretation
of this provision has been legally debated. The suggestion has been that HAVA
requires voting systems produce a paper record of the vote cast by each voter
that has been seen and verified by the voter. Others argue that the paper trail
for the manual audit requirement can be satisfied by a printout of what the
computer has stored after the polls close, without ever offering the voter the
opportunity to review.
Federal Response to VVPAT
Debate
National demands for increased voter security and a requirement for voter
verified paper trail received attention from members of Congress in 2003. Rep.
Rush Holt (D-NJ) introduced H.R. 2239, the Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2003, which requires all voting systems purchased with HAVA
funds provide a VVPAT. Sen. Hillary
Clinton (D-NY) and Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL) introduced S. 1980, a companion to
Rep. Rush’s bill. Both bills have received numerous endorsements, however,
neither has received Congressional committee consideration.
During April 2004, Congress introduced several bills requiring a voter
verifiable paper trail. Rep. King (D-IA) introduced H.R. 4187, the Know Your
Vote Counts Act of 2004. The bill seeks to amend HAVA and clarify the
requirement that voting systems produce a verifiable record of each vote cast
and ensure the security of electronic data. Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Sen.
Bob Graham (D-FL) introduced S. 2313, the Record Act of 2004, which calls for a
voter verified paper audit trail and seeks to extend HAVA deadlines to provide
states with more time to secure electronic voting systems with VVPATs. The
Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2004, S. 2437, seeks to amend the
wording of HAVA to require a voter verifiable paper trail.
As of July 2004, none of the proposed legislation has received committee
consideration in Congress. Many
members of Congress claim they do not want to act on voting security legislation
until the Election Assistance Commission completes its evaluation and makes
recommendations. For now, Congress has decided to suspend the voting security
debate.
State Response to VVPAT
Debate
As of July 2004, five states require voting systems have a VVPAT: Missouri, Nevada, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Oregon. Sixteen states have introduced or have pending VVPAT legislation. Illinois law was changed in 2003 and requires that all voting systems approved by the Illinois State Board of Election provide a VVPAT.
Electronic Voting Resources
Generally
·
Illinois State Board
of Elections, http://www.elections.state.il
·
Federal Election
Commission, http://www.fec.gov
·
Election Assistance
Commission, http://www.eac.gov
·
The Election Center,
http://www.electioncenter.org
·
Electionline.org,
http://www.electionline.org
·
Election Data
Services, http://www.electiondataservices.com
·
National Commission
on Federal Election Reform, http://www.reformelections.org
·
National
Organization on Disabilities, http://www.nod.org
·
ACE Project,
http://www.aceproject.org
·
Federal Voting
Assistance Program for US citizens covered by the Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens
Absentee Voting Act, http://www.fvap.org
·
National
Student/Parent Mock Election,
http://www.nationalmockelection.org
·
Project Vote Smart,
http://www.vote-smart.org
·
Center for Voting
and Democracy, http:// www.fairvote.org
·
National Association
of Counties, http://www.uscounties.org
·
National Association
of Secretaries of State Election Information,
http://www.nass.org/electioninfo/electioninfo.html
·
International
Foundation for Election Systems Project on Disabled Voters,
http://www.electionaccess.org
·
National Conference
of State Legislatures Election Information,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/elect.htm
Election
Reform
·
U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, Is America Ready to Vote? Election Readiness Briefing
Paper, April 2004,
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2004/ready/ready04.htm.
·
Electionline.org,
Election Reform 2004: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why, January 2004,
http://www.electionline.org/site/docs/pdf/ERIP_AR2004.PDF
·
Electionline.org,
Election Reform Briefing, Working Together? State and Local Election
Coordination, September 2002,
http://www.electionline.org/site/docs/pdf/working.together.pdf
·
National Conference
State Legislatures Election Reform Database,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/taskfc/database.htm
Direct Recording
Electronic Voting Machines
·
Black Box Voting,
http://www.blackboxvoting.org
·
Verified Voting,
http://www.verifiedvoting.org
·
Electionline.org,
Election Reform Briefing: Securing the Vote, April 2004,
http://www.electionline.org/site/docs/pdf/EB7_new.pdf
·
League of Women
Voters, Questions and Answers on Direct Recording (DRE) Voting Systems and
the Proposal to Require a
Voter-Verified Paper Trail (VVPT),
http://www.lwv.org/join/elections/HAVA_QAonDRE.pdf.
·
Brennan Center for
Justice and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Recommendations for
Improving Reliability of
Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems, June 2004,
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/voting_systems_final_recommendations.pdf
Voting System
Standards
·
Federal Election
Commission Voting Standards,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/vssfinal/vss.html
·
Federal Election
Commission Voting Standards Q&A,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/faqsvss.htm
·
National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST), http://vote.nist.gov
·
National Institute
of Standards and Technology, Symposium on Voting Standards,
http://realex.nist.gov/voting-standards
Voting System
Studies
·
CalTech-MIT Voting
Technology Project, http://www.vote.caltech.edu
·
CalTech-MIT Voting
Technology Project, Voting: What Is; What Could Be, July 2001.
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/.
·
IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy 2004, Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, IEEE
Computer Society Press,
May 2004, http://avirubin.com/vote.pdf.
·
Election Data
Services, New Study Shows 50 Million Voters Will Use Electronic Voting
Systems, 32 Million Still with
Punch Cards in 2004,
http://www.electiondataservices.com/EDSInc_VEstudy2004.pdf
·
Science Applications
International Corporation, Risk Assessment Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting
System and Processes, September
2003, http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/SBE.
·
RABA Technologies,
LLC, Trusted Agent Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System, January
2004, http://www.raba.com/press/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf.
Voter Verified Paper
Trails
·
Verified Voting,
http://www.verifiedvoting.org
·
H.R. 2239, 108th
Cong. (2003), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.2239:
·
H.R. 4187, 108th
Cong. (2004), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.4187:
·
S. 1980, 108th Cong.
(2003), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:S.1980:
·
S. 2313, 108th Cong.
(2004), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:S.2313:
·
S. 2437, 108th Cong.
(2004), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:S.2437:
Help America Vote Act
(HAVA)
·
Help America Vote
Act of 2002, P.L. 107-252, available at
http://fecweb1.fec.gov/hava/law_ext.txt
·
Federal Election
Commission HAVA Information,
http://fecweb1.fec.gov/hava/hava.htm
About The Citizen Advocacy Center
The Citizen Advocacy Center is a nonpartisan, 501(c)(3), not-for-profit organization, is dedicated to building democracy for the 21st Century by strengthening the public’s capacities, resources, and institutions for self-government. If you are interested in more information, becoming a volunteer, or making a tax-deductible contribution to the Center, please feel free to contact us at:
The Citizen Advocacy
Center, 238 N. York Road, Elmhurst, IL
60126-0420
Phone: (630)
833-4080
Fax: (630) 833-4083
E-mail:
cac@citizenadvocacycenter.org
Website: www.citizenadvocacycenter.org
© Copyright 2004 Citizen Advocacy Center. All rights reserved. No part of this pamphlet may be reproduced in any form or by any means without the prior written consent of the Citizen Advocacy Center.