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The November 2000 Presidential election publicly
showcased many problems with America's electoral system and highlighted
the need for immediate and significant nationwide electoral reform.
American voters learned that, among many other problems, the punch card
voting system used within most states to elect public officials was
partially to blame for the controversy. Voters demanded that election
authorities evaluate voting and ensure the problems of 2000 would not
be repeated. As a result of this public outcry, Congress passed the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA authorized the distribution
of $3.9 billion dollars in federal funds, over three years, to assist
states with improving the administration of elections. States use the
federal funds to purchase new voting equipment, develop election worker
training materials, create statewide voter registration databases, and
improve access to the polls for all Americans. Deadlines were set for
suggested and mandatory requirements. The goal is for election authorities
to make significant improvements in time for the November 2004 election,
and achieve full implementation of all mandates by 2006.
Following the passage of HAVA, state and local
election authorities were given the opportunity to apply for federal
funds to replace the punch card voting systems that were at the center
of controversy in 2000. Companies manufacturing election equipment eagerly
demonstrated technologically advanced systems, including touch screen
electronic voting machines, otherwise known as "direct recording electronic"
voting machines (DREs). Election authorities across the country began
spending millions of dollars to purchase new voting equipment, and began
touting the advantages of the upgraded systems to their citizens. However,
the American public discovered electronic voting presented new and controversial
challenges focused on voting machine technology, security concerns,
and the lack of a voter verifiable paper trail. The controversy over
DREs has forced many states to reexamine the very system that was supposed
to rectify voter concerns.
Meanwhile, two-thirds of American voters, including
all voters in Illinois, will use the vilified punch cards or optical
scan voting systems during the November 2004 Presidential election.
Illinois does not currently use electronic voting systems, however,
the State Board of Elections and the 110 election authorities throughout
Illinois are preparing for electronic voting. By January 1, 2006, HAVA
requires election authorities to provide a DRE or other accessible voting
system in each polling place that allows disabled and visually impaired
voters to cast an independent and private ballot. Some counties will
provide electronic voting for all voters and some will have mixed systems.
DuPage County will continue to use the newly purchased optical scan
voting machines and comply with HAVA by providing electronic voting
machines once the State Board of Elections approves a system for use.
The following guide offers information on voting
systems used throughout the United States, voting system standards,
voter verifiable paper audit trails, and a variety of electronic voting
resources.
Voting Systems in the United States
Each state has the discretion to choose the
voting system that best meets the needs of their citizens. Despite the
existence of federal voting standards, states are not required to adopt
federal standards or conduct their own independent testing before using
a voting system. In Illinois, however, the Illinois Election Code requires
all voting systems used within the State to meet the federal requirements
and receive certification by the Illinois State Board of Elections.
The Illinois State Board of Elections has authority to approve punch
card, optical scan, or direct recording electronic voting systems.
To date, the State Board has not approved the
use of any electronic voting system. According to Election Data Services,
during the November 2004 election nearly 29% of eligible voters will
use computerized voting systems, 32% will use optical scan systems,
19% will use punch cards, 13% will use lever machines, less than 1%
will use paper ballots, and 6% will use mixed systems.
Paper Ballots
The oldest voting system used is the paper ballot.
Using a paper ballot and a pencil or pen, the voter marks their choice
for candidate or political question and places the ballot in a box.
Ballots are counted manually after polls close. This method was universally
used during the 19th century and is still used throughout the country,
particularly in small communities and rural areas. In 2000, 370 counties
used paper ballots. For the 2004 election, approximately 299 counties
are expected to use paper ballots exclusively.
States with jurisdictions using paper ballots:
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin
Mechanical Lever Voting Machines
Mechanical lever machines have a steel booth
that contains a card with the list of candidates and political questions,
several switches, and a large lever. Voters review the list and vote
by flipping the switch below their choice. Once the voter has completed
reviewing the ballot and has flipped all necessary switches, the voter
pulls the large lever. The lever registers the votes on a counter located
on the back of the machine. After the polling place closes, votes cast
in each machine are tallied by election judges. While lever machines
give the voter the opportunity to make changes prior to casting final
votes, the machine does not provide a verifiable paper audit trail,
as required by HAVA. Additionally, they do not allow disabled and visually
impaired voters the opportunity to cast a private, independent ballot.
Lever machines were introduced in 1892 and were
widely used until the 1970s. They are no longer produced and are considered
antiques, however, many states still allow their use. Lever machines
were used by 20.7% of American voters during the 1996 election, and
18% of American voters during the 2000 election. For the 2004 election,
270 counties across the country will use lever machines.
States with jurisdictions using lever voting:
Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
Punch Card Voting Machines
Punch card machines use a paper ballot, a ballot
book listing the candidates and political questions, a metal puncher,
and a computerized card sorter. In the voting booth, the voter inserts
the ballot into a slot and opens the ballot book. The voter uses a metal
puncher to punch out the rectangle, otherwise known as the chad, next
to the candidate of their choice. When finished, the voter removes the
card and places it in the ballot box. Usually, the voter feeds the ballot
into a computer vote tabulator at the precinct. The tabulator counts
the number of perforations next to each candidate's name. In some precincts,
election judges put all ballots into the computer tabulator after the
polls close.
Once considered to be the safest way to vote,
punch card machines were the main source of controversy following the
2000 election. Many jurisdictions did not know how to properly count
votes because states did not have a uniform definition of what constituted
a vote. Some jurisdictions counted votes as long as the Chad was perforated
in one corner, whereas other jurisdictions only counted the vote if
the Chad was completely detached. HAVA requires each state to develop
a uniform definition of what constitutes a vote.
States with jurisdictions using punch cards:
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wyoming
Optical Scan Voting Machines
Optical scan voting systems use a paper ballot,
a pencil, and a scanning/tabulating machine with a memory card that
scans and counts the votes. Voters mark their choices on the ballot
using a marker, typically a #2 pencil. If the jurisdiction has a central
count optical scan system, voters deposit the ballot in a ballot box
and election judges feed them in the tabulator machine after the poll
closes. If the jurisdiction uses a precinct count optical scan machine,
the voter feeds the ballot into the tabulating machine. The machine
notifies the voter if there is a problem with the ballot, such as an
over vote (choosing more than one candidate in a contest) or an under
vote (failing to make a selection in a contest). The voter then has
the option of correcting the ballot or overriding the vote, in which
case the vote will not count. A voter choosing to correct the ballot
must request a new ballot from an election judge. Once the ballot is
complete, the voter deposits the ballot into the machine and the ballot
is preserved in a ballot boxes. Ballots are used if a recount is necessary
and serve as paper record of all votes cast. After the polls close,
the election judges run a final tally and all votes are counted. Results
are either transmitted via modem or the memory card is read by a central
computer after the equipment is returned to the election authority.
Optical scan voting machines are considered safe
and do not pose many security concerns. Most run on batteries or have
an electrical cord and a battery backup. The paper ballot serves as
a safeguard in case of computer malfunction. However, precinct count
optical scan voting machines that transmit election results to a central
counting location via modem have been subject to criticism because of
the increased risk of tampering. Additionally, optical scan voting systems
do not allow disabled and visually impaired voters the opportunity to
cast a private and independent ballot.
States with jurisdictions using optical scan:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of
Columbia*, Florida, Hawaii*, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma*, Oregon**, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island*, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming * Denotes uniform optical scan ** All elections
conducted by mail using optical scan ballots
Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machines (DREs)
A "Direct Recording Electronic" voting machine, more commonly referred
to as a DRE, electronically records votes directly entered by the voter.
The computer-based system is usually a touch screen voting machine,
although some DREs use switches instead of touch screens. Using a DRE,
the voter selects the candidate or votes on the issue by touching the
computer screen. Votes are saved in a variety of locations within the
computer memory and can be tallied throughout the election or after
the polls close. Despite benefits to voters and administrators, security
concerns have placed electronic voting and DREs at the center of controversy
and ignited national debate. Improved access to voting is a definite
advantage with a DRE system. Devices are available to provide disabled
and visually impaired voters the opportunity to cast a private, independent
ballot. The touch screen eliminates the use of the marking pencil and
allows greater access for individuals with limited mobility. Earphones
are also available for visually impaired voters or voters with limited
reading skills. DREs can provide ballots in multiple languages. DREs
comply with second chance voting requirements of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 (HAVA). Voters have the opportunity to privately review
and make changes to the ballot before it is officially cast and counted.
The machine notifies the voter if they overvote (vote for more than
one candidate) or undervote (fail to cast a vote for a contest). Since
votes are directly tabulated, election officials can provide fast election
results and reduce possible errors due to ballot handling.
Electronic voting machines are beneficial, however, security issues,
computer malfunctions, and a lack of a voter verifiable paper trail
have forced many election officials and voters to oppose the use of
DREs. Studies released by John Hopkins University and Rice University
revealed flaws in the design and development of electronic voting machines
and alleged that computer hackers could alter the outcome of elections.
Voting machine manufacturers, such as Diebold Election Systems, Inc.,
have denied such claims, but independent studies have determined that
electronic voting is susceptible to tampering. Any voting system is
vulnerable if proper procedures and safeguards are not in place, but
DREs present a unique problem because they do not provide the same type
of paper trail as other voting machines.
Under HAVA, voting systems are required to produce an auditable paper
trail, however, HAVA does not specify that the paper trail must be verifiable
by the voter. Citizen groups, lawmakers, and election equipment manufacturers
debate the need for a voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT). DREs
are quite expensive compared to other voting systems, and when a voter
verified paper audit trail is required the cost significantly increases.
DREs comply with HAVA because voter information can be printed throughout
the day or at the end of the election. However, many people question
how voters can be assured their votes are counted citing safeguards
for a system crash, incorrectly computed votes, and a lack of paper
backup, or worse case scenario, hacker manipulation of election results.
With all the controversy and the pros and cons of using DREs, the ultimate
debate remains whether or not the advantages outweigh the concerns.
States with jurisdictions using DREs: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware*, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia*,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland*, Michigan, Mississippi,
Nevada*, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming * Denotes uniform DRE
Voting System Standards
What are voting system standards?
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) developed voting system standards
with the assistance of a variety of groups, including election equipment
experts and the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED).
They are voluntary guidelines used to assist state and local election
authorities purchasing election equipment. The standards ensure the
voting systems used within their jurisdictions work accurately and reliably.
Voting system standards contain technical specifications used as guidelines
to ensure that automated voting systems (both paper ballot and electronic
systems) are accurate, reliable, and secure. The standards include functional
criteria as well as technical requirements for hardware, software, security,
quality assurance, and documentation. Recommended testing procedures
to ensure that voting systems meet these requirements are also included.
The standards rate voting systems use criteria such as electronic management,
accessibility for people with disabilities and the visually impaired,
communication capacities, voter "friendliness," and audit trails.
Until recently, the FEC headed efforts to develop and review voting
system standards. NASED was responsible for qualified voting systems.
With the passage of HAVA, the responsibility for reviewing voting system
guidelines and standards was transferred to the newly created Election
Assistance Commission (EAC). To date, the EAC Technical Guidance Committee
has not determined how voting system standards will be administered
in the future. Voting system standards and certification information
is available on FEC and NASED websites.
How are voting systems tested using the standards?
-
- There are three levels of tests performed on voting systems to ensure
that the end product works accurately, reliably, and appropriately.
The first level is the qualifying test. Manufacturers interested in
having their equipment qualified submit their devices to an independent
testing authority designated (ITA) by NASED. The ITA performs a variety
of tests on the equipment, including any software programs and coding.
If the equipment passes all tests, NASED may qualify the equipment.
Level two, certification tests, may be performed by individual states.
States may require additional testing before certifying equipment for
use. Manufacturers must pay for any required testing. The final level,
acceptance tests, should be performed by individual jurisdictions acquiring
the system. Election authorities should perform their own testing to
determine if the equipment meets the needs of the citizens under their
jurisdiction.
-
- Are states required to use voting system standards?
-
- NO!! States may voluntarily adopt the standards. The FEC recommends
states adopt federal standards, develop their own certification
processes, and test at the local level to ensure the system meets
the needs of the local community.
Has Illinois adopted the Federal standards?
YES!! Voting systems used by the 110 election authorities in Illinois
must meet the federal standards and receive certification by the Illinois
State Board of Elections. All voting software must be escrowed. Under
Illinois law, the State Board of Elections has discretion to certify
punch card voting machines, optical scan voting machines, and direct
recording electronic voting machines. As of July 2004, the Illinois
State Board of Elections has only certified punch card and optical scan
systems. Electronic voting devices are being reviewed, however, none
have been certified. Many states are waiting for the Election Assistance
Commission to provide new standards and guidelines before certifying
any electronic voting machines.
What is a VVPAT?
A voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) allows a voter using an
electronic voting machine to independently verify that the machine correctly
recorded and counted the votes. A voter using a paper ballot, punch
card, or an optical scan ballot, has a paper record in-hand and is provided
with the opportunity to independently review all votes before casting
the ballot. Voters electronically voting using most DREs do not receive
a printed version of their ballot and do not have the opportunity to
verify that the choices they have selected will actually be counted
as a vote. The argument in favor of VVPAT is simply voter security.
Electronic voting technology is unreliable and subject to error or election
tampering. If election tampering is suspected, or if an error occurs,
there is no way to determine the outcome of the election without a VVPAT.
Many argue there is no need for a VVPAT since computers record the information
in a variety of locations and election tampering would require a large-scale
conspiracy.
HAVA requires voting systems used in elections for Federal office produce
a paper record that can be used for manual audits. However, the interpretation
of this provision has been legally debated. The suggestion has been
that HAVA requires voting systems produce a paper record of the vote
cast by each voter that has been seen and verified by the voter. Others
argue that the paper trail for the manual audit requirement can be satisfied
by a printout of what the computer has stored after the polls close,
without ever offering the voter the opportunity to review.
Federal Response to VVPAT Debate
National demands for increased voter security and a requirement for
voter verified paper trail received attention from members of Congress
in 2003. Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ) introduced H.R. 2239, the Voter Confidence
and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003, which requires all voting systems
purchased with HAVA funds provide a VVPAT. Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-NY)
and Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL) introduced S. 1980, a companion to Rep. Rush's
bill. Both bills have received numerous endorsements, however, neither
has received Congressional committee consideration.
During April 2004, Congress introduced several bills requiring a voter
verifiable paper trail. Rep. King (D-IA) introduced H.R. 4187, the Know
Your Vote Counts Act of 2004. The bill seeks to amend HAVA and clarify
the requirement that voting systems produce a verifiable record of each
vote cast and ensure the security of electronic data. Sen. Hillary Clinton
(D-NY) and Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL) introduced S. 2313, the Record Act
of 2004, which calls for a voter verified paper audit trail and seeks
to extend HAVA deadlines to provide states with more time to secure
electronic voting systems with VVPATs. The Voting Integrity and Verification
Act of 2004, S. 2437, seeks to amend the wording of HAVA to require
a voter verifiable paper trail.
As of July 2004, none of the proposed legislation has received committee
consideration in Congress. Many members of Congress claim they do not
want to act on voting security legislation until the Election Assistance
Commission completes its evaluation and makes recommendations. For now,
Congress has decided to suspend the voting security debate.
State Response to VVPAT Debate
As of July 2004, five states require voting systems have a VVPAT: Missouri,
Nevada, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Oregon. Sixteen states have introduced
or have pending VVPAT legislation. Illinois law was changed in 2003
and requires that all voting systems approved by the Illinois State
Board of Election provide a VVPAT.
Electronic Voting Resources
Generally
- Illinois State Board of Elections, http://www.elections.state.il
- Federal Election Commission, http://www.fec.gov
- Election Assistance Commission, http://www.eac.gov
- The Election Center, http://www.electioncenter.org
- Electionline.org, http://www.electionline.org
- Election Data Services,
http://www.electiondataservices.com
- National Commission on Federal Election Reform, http://www.reformelections.org
- National Organization on Disabilities, http://www.nod.org
- ACE Project, http://www.aceproject.org
- Federal Voting Assistance Program for US citizens covered by the Uniformed
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, http://www.fvap.org
- National Student/Parent Mock Election, http://www.nationalmockelection.org
- Project Vote Smart, http://www.vote-smart.org
- Center for Voting and Democracy, http://
www.fairvote.org
- National Association of Counties, http://www.uscounties.org
- National Association of Secretaries of State Election Information,
http://www.nass.org/electioninfo/electioninfo.html
- International Foundation for Election Systems Project on Disabled
Voters, http://www.electionaccess.org
- National Conference of State Legislatures Election Information, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/elect.htm
Election Reform
- · U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Is America Ready to Vote? Election
Readiness Briefing Paper, April 2004, http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2004/ready/ready04.htm.
- · Electionline.org, Election Reform 2004: What's Changed, What Hasn't,
and Why, January 2004, http://www.electionline.org/site/docs/pdf/ERIP_AR2004.PDF
- · Electionline.org, Election Reform Briefing, Working Together? State
and Local Election Coordination, September 2002, http://www.electionline.org/site/docs/pdf/working.together.pdf
- · National Conference State Legislatures Election Reform Database,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/taskfc/database.htm
Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machines
- Black Box Voting, http://www.blackboxvoting.org
- Verified Voting, http://www.verifiedvoting.org
- Electionline.org, Election Reform Briefing: Securing the Vote, April
2004, http://www.electionline.org/site/docs/pdf/EB7_new.pdf
- League of Women Voters, Questions and Answers on Direct Recording
(DRE) Voting Systems and the Proposal to Require a Voter-Verified Paper
Trail (VVPT), http://www.lwv.org/join/elections/HAVA_QAonDRE.pdf.
- Brennan Center for Justice and the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights, Recommendations for Improving Reliability of Direct Recording
Electronic Voting Systems, June 2004, http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/voting_systems_final_recommendations.pdf
Voting System Standards
Voting System Studies
- CalTech-MIT Voting Technology Project, http://www.vote.caltech.edu
- CalTech-MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is; What Could
Be, July 2001. http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/.
- IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2004, Analysis of an Electronic
Voting System, IEEE Computer Society Press, May 2004,
http://avirubin.com/vote.pdf.
- Election Data Services, New Study Shows 50 Million Voters Will Use
Electronic Voting Systems, 32 Million Still with Punch Cards in 2004,
http://www.electiondataservices.com/EDSInc_VEstudy2004.pdf
- Science Applications International Corporation, Risk Assessment Report:
Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System and Processes, September 2003, http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/SBE.
- RABA Technologies, LLC, Trusted Agent Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS
Voting System, January 2004, http://www.raba.com/press/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf.
Voter Verified Paper Trails
- Verified Voting, http://www.verifiedvoting.org
- H.R. 2239, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.2239
H.R. 4187, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.4187
- S. 1980, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:S.1980
- S. 2313, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:S.2313
- S. 2437, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:S.2437
Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
About The Citizen Advocacy Center The Citizen Advocacy Center is a nonpartisan,
501(c)(3), not-for-profit organization, is dedicated to building democracy
for the 21st Century by strengthening the public's capacities, resources,
and institutions for self-government. If you are interested in more information,
becoming a volunteer, or making a tax-deductible contribution to the Center,
please feel free to contact us at: The Citizen Advocacy Center, 238 N.
York Road, Elmhurst, IL 60126-0420 Phone: (630) 833-4080 Fax: (630) 833-4083
E-mail: cac@citizenadvocacycenter.org Website: www.citizenadvocacycenter.org
© Copyright 2004 Citizen Advocacy Center. All rights reserved. No part
of this pamphlet may be reproduced in any form or by any means without
the prior written consent of the Citizen Advocacy Center.
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